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The Dynamics of State Protectionism: A
Short Critique of the CTS Decision
THOMAS
I.

J. BAMONTE*

INTRODUCTION

In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America' the Supreme Court
upheld Indiana's Control Share Acquisition Chapter 2 against constitutional challenges that the Chapter interfered with interstate commerce and was preempted by the Williams Act. The Indiana Chapter
is a thinly veiled piece of protectionist legislation designed to shield
Indiana corporations from so-called hostile tender offers, almost all
of which would come from out-of-state acquirors. The Chapter easily
ran afoul of the well-defined constitutional standards that had been
established by the federal courts prior to CTS.
There is little -to justify the Supreme Court's rejection of the
forceful but tempered approach of the lower federal courts to state
anti-takeover legislation. The CTS decision is certainly bad economics.
As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, state restrictions on hostile
takeovers are "economic folly" that promote "industrial stagnation." 3 A vigorous market for corporate control ensures the dynamic
flow of capital that is a prerequisite to long-term economic growth.
The CTS decision is also bad constitutional law. One of the Court's
great achievements has been its use of the Commerce Clause to prevent
the balkanization of the American economy and the centrifugal
political forces that would result from such balkanization. The CTS
Court turned its back on this history and neglected its judicial
responsibility to check the political forces that drive states to enact
protectionist anti-takeover legislation.
II.

THE

INTERSTATE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

As the economy has grown and the pace of technological change
has increased, there has developed vigorous commerce in the control
* Attorney, Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. B.A.,
University of Chicago; J.D., Northwestern University. Mr. Bamonte was one of the
attorneys representing Dynamics Corporation of America in the Supreme Court.

1. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).

2. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).
3. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1653 (Scalia J., concurring).
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over corporate assets. 4 The existence of a market for corporate control
permits the control over corporate assets to be obtained by the party
who can make most efficient and hence profitable use of the assets.
The market for corporate control is closely linked to the interstate
markets for corporate securities and capital assets.
An open market for corporate control is a prerequisite for the
dynamic process of economic reordering necessary for long-term
economic growth. A recent study of approximately 18,000 manufacturing plants found, for example, that the least productive plants in
an industry are most likely to change in owners, and that plants
changing owners exhibit a significantly higher average growth in
productivity than those that did not change owners.5
Control over corporate assets is transferred in a myriad of ways. 6
Most corporate control mechanisms operate with the consent of the
management of the "target corporation" which is the subject of the
change in control. Such corporate control mechanisms include mergers, leveraged buy-outs and the sale of assets. Consequently, most
transfers of corporate control are relatively routine, consensual business transactions between the acquiror and the target corporation. 7
A few corporate control mechanisms, however, permit the acSquiror to obtain control over a corporation despite the objections of
the management of the target corporation. A hostile tender offer, for
example, is a cost-effective means of acquiring corporate control over
the opposition of the entrenched management of the target company.'
A tender offer allows the acquiror to buy shares of the target
corporation directly from the shareholders. The tender offeror gains

4. See generally Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73

J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).

5. Lichtenberg & Siegel, Productivity and Changes in Ownership of Manufac-

turing Plants, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 643 (Vol. 3, 1987). This
research is summarized in Lichtenberg, What Makes Plant Productivity Grow?, Wall

St. J., Dec. 24, 1987, at 6, col. 3.

6. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate

Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv 1, 5-7 (1978).
7. Friendly mergers and acquisitions account for over ninety percent of
corporate control transactions. See Matheson & Norbery, Hostile Share Acquisitions
and Corporate Governing, 47 U. PiTT. L. REv. 407, 411-412 (1986). The dollar
amount of tender offers may be proportionally greater, however, than the number
of tender offers.
8. A proxy campaign is a less effective way to shift control without the consent
of target company management. Proxy campaigns tend to be more expensive than
tender offers and have a lower probability of success because of management's

dominance of the proxy machinery. Fischel, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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corporate control by exercising the voting rights attached to the shares

tendered by the shareholders. 9
Hostile tender offers substantially increase the liquidity and hence
the efficiency of the market for corporate control. First, tender offers
permit acquirors to circumvent the management of target companies
that attempt to hold out from the operation of the market for
corporate control by resisting value-maximizing changes in control. 0
Second, the threat of a hostile tender offer forces the management of

all corporations to be more receptive to opportunities for friendly
corporate control transactions. Corporate management knows that its
failure to engage in value-maximizing corporate control transactions,
as either a target company or an acquiror, may make their company
a more attractive target for a hostile tender offer. The economic

evidence shows the positive wealth effects associated with tender
offers."
III.

POLITICAL IMPERFECTIONS MAKE PROTECTIONIST STATE ANTITAKEOVER LEGISLATION INEVITABLE

Since the advent of tender offers in the mid-1960s, states have
persistently sought to restrict hostile tender offers for corporations
with a substantial local presence. 2 The protectionist character of state
anti-takeover legislation results from three features of the market for
corporate control that have important political ramifications on the
state level. Together, these features create nearly irresistible political
pressure for the type of pro-management anti-takeover legislation that
has been adopted by most states. 13
9. For a discussion of the mechanism of tender offers, see E. ARANOW AND
(1973).
10. Incumbent management understandably resists changes in corporate control
because they will lose control over "their" company and all the accompanying
perquisites. Consequently, the management and shareholders of a target corporation
often have divergent interests when corporate control is at stake. See, e.g., Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) noting "the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders" when responding to a hostile
tender offer. Id. at 954.
11. See Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions
and their Division Between the Stockholders of the Target & Acquiring Firms, J.
FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 1988). See also Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. L. 345 (1980); Dodd & Ruback, Tender
Offers and Stockholder Returns, 5 J. FiN. ECON. 351 (1977).
12. See generally Note, The Constitutionalityof Second Generation Takeover
Statutes, 73 VA. L. Rnv. 203, 207-212 (1987).
13. See Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv.
111 (1987). See generally C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets, 92 ETIcs 720 (1982).
H.

EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 46-63
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First, the costs resulting from changes in corporate control are
dramatic and tend to be borne by relatively few parties. Changes in
corporate control can be followed by wrenching localized economic
and social dislocations. A redundant factory may be shut down after
the merger of two companies. A business with strong local ties
suddenly may be controlled by outsiders after a tender offer. Management may be replaced by a successful acquiror.
While the negative effects of changes in corporate control are
localized and dramatic, the benefits from the operation of the market
for corporate control tend to be long-term and spread nationwide.
Certainly the closing of a factory is a far more tangible result of a
change in corporate control than the economic benefits that all
consumers may enjoy as a result of the efficiencies realized from the
change in management. This concentration of costs versus the diffusion of benefits means that it is much easier to mobilize state political
forces in favor of anti-takeover legislation than against such legislation.
Second, local business interests, which are the chief beneficiaries
of anti-takeover legislation, have substantial political influence in the
state legislature. In contrast, the predominately non-resident beneficiaries of the operation of the market for corporate control are neither
politically mobilized against anti-takeover legislation nor represented
in individual state legislatures. Thus, anti-takeover legislation is especially attractive to state legislators because the costs of such legislation are borne primarily by non-resident shareholders and potential
14
bidders while the benefits accrue to politically powerful local elites.
Third, the intense competition between states for corporate charters and investment' 5 forces states to offer tough anti-takeover laws
in order to induce resident corporations to remain incorporated in the
state and to attract corporations from other states. Anti-takeover laws
become bargaining chips for the competing states because protection
against hostile takeovers is of key importance to incumbent management. Even those who reject the "race to the bottom" hypothesis and
14. Adoption of state anti-takeover legislation results in a drop in the average
value of the resident corporations covered by the law. This loss is borne by
shareholders nationwide. See SEC Office of the Chief Economist, Shareholder Wealth
Effects of Ohio Legislation Affecting Takeovers (May 18, 1987); FTC Bureau of
Economics, State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The Effects of
New York's 1985 Takeover Statute (Mar. 1987). See also Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do
Targets Gain from Defeating Hostile Offers? 59 N.Y.U.L. REv. 277 (1984).
15. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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oppose an increased federal role in the regulation of corporations
recognize that interstate competition for corporate investment will
lead to more and not fewer protectionist state anti-takeover laws.1 6
State anti-takeover laws mirror the interests of their local business
sponsors. Even though state anti-takeover legislation is sometimes
touted as protecting local communities from economic dislocations
that may follow changes in corporate control, state anti-takeover laws
typically restrict only hostile takeovers. Yet, there is no evidence that
changes in corporate control sanctioned by management result in any
fewer economic dislocations than hostile takeovers. 7 Local communities would be much better protected by plant closing legislation,
state acquisition of controlling interests in important local companies,
and job retraining for displaced workers. 8 Despite their greater effectiveness, such initiatives are much less common than anti-takeover
legislation because they would restrict managerial discretion to arrange
friendly changes in corporate control and thus are vigorously opposed
by local business interests.19
Even though another purported rationale for anti-takeover legislation is the protection of shareholders, the economic evidence shows
that shareholders of target companies reap premiums of 30-40% on
the average. 20 Moreover, such legislation is characteristically riddled
with pro-management provisions that are inconsistent with shareholder
interests. Anti-takeover laws, for example, usually do not extend their
purported shareholder protections to management-initiated changes in
2
corporate control. '
16. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory, of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 251, 287-89 (1977).
17. For example, Chrysler Corporation announced its intention to close its
Kenosha, Wisconsin automobile assembly plant that it recently purchased from
American Motors Company. The plant is Kenosha's largest employer. Closing it will
terminate some 5,500 jobs in a city of approximately 75,000, and it expected to
double the local unemployment rate to 18 percent. See O'Connor, Kenosha Plant
Closing "Irrevocable", Chicago Tribune, Feb. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 1; Franklin &
O'Connor, Kenosha Suffers a Blowout in Chrysler "Race", Chicago Tribune, Jan.
31, 1988, at 16, col. 1.
18. See Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1987)
(upholding a state law requiring employers upon a plant closing to provide severance

payments to certain employees).

19. See Note, NLRA Preemption of State and Local Plant Relocation Laws,

86 COLUM. L. Rlv. 407, 407 n.6 (1986) (only six states have enacted laws requiring

notice and severance pay to employees upon plant closings).
20. See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
21. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-2(d)(5) (West Supp. 1987) (exempting
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IV. BEFORE CTS THE FEDERAL JuDIcIARY EFFECTIVELY CHECKED
PROTECTIONIST STATE RESTRICTIONS ON THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL

Prior to CTS, the federal judiciary corrected for the political
imbalances at the state level and upheld the overriding national interest
in the preservation of open national markets for corporate control
and securities. Federal courts used both the Commerce Clause and a
preemption analysis under the Williams Act to strike down protectionist state anti-takeover legislation. 22 Their opinions rested on an
understanding of the political dynamics that foster state anti-takeover
legislation, of the chilling effect of such legislation on the market for
corporate control and of the importance of the long-standing constitutional check on state protectionism.
A.

THE WILLIAMS ACT

The Williams Act 2 illustrates the much more balanced form of
tender offer regulation that emerges from a legislature when the
national interest in a vigorous market for corporate control is represented. 24 The Williams Act was introduced, like most state antimanagement-initiated changes in corporate control from control share acquisition
chapter). State courts are also predisposed in favor of anti-takeover defenses implemented by management in order to thwart a threatened takeover. Compare Moran
v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1352 (1985) (upholding "poison
pill" shareholder rights plan), with Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794
F.2d 250, 259 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (striking
down rights plan).
22. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th
Cir. 1983); Telvest Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); National City Lines, Inc. v.
LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Copper v. Smith, 637 F.2d
181 (3d Cir. 1980); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1974); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986);
Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F.
Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Dart Indus. Inc. v. Contrad, 462 F. Supp. (S.D. Ind.
1978). But see Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982);
City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Ind. 1979). See also generally
Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky,
or CorporationLaw Concepts, 7 Cornp L. REv. 3 (1984).
23. The Williams Act, enacted in 1968 and amended in 1970, added Sections
13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Act of
July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454; Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) & (e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1986)).
24. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984)
("[W]hen Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented, and there is
significantly less danger that one State will be in a position to exploit others.").
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takeover legislation, as a strongly pro-management measure aimed at
"white collar pirates" who allegedly were laying waste to "proud old
companies. '25 However, significant opposition to the Williams Act
soon developed. These opponents stressed the positive features of
tender offers and the market for corporate control. Consequently,
many of the pro-management provisions of the original Williams Act,
such as a requirement that the tender offeror notify target company
management prior to making a tender offer, were dropped. 26 Even
the co-sponsor of the Williams Act stressed that the Act in its final
form was designed to favor neither the acquiror nor the management
of the target corporation, but was designed only to protect shareholders. 27

The Williams Act is an ingenious compromise between the protection of shareholders and the maintenance of the liquidity of the
market for corporate control. Shareholders are protected by various
reporting, anti-discrimination and anti-fraud provisions. Liquidity is
preserved by allowing tender offerors to deal directly with the shareholders of the target corporation without undue interference from
management.

Federal courts regularly used the Williams Act to preempt state
anti-takeover legislation. 28 They found that the inherently pro-management bias of state anti-takeover legislation directly conflicted with
Congress' preservation of a level playing field between the tender
offeror and target company management. 29
Less often, but perhaps more persuasively, federal courts struck
down state anti-takeover legislation on the ground that such legislation
interfered with the "market approach" to tender offer regulation
adopted by Congress for the purpose of maximizing investor autonomy.30 State anti-takeover legislation typically interferes with the direct

25. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REc. 28,257 (1965).
26. See S.2731, 89th cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REc. 28,259 (1965).
27. See 113 Cong. Rec. at 24664 (1967) (Statement by Senator Williams). See
also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Indus., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.
Ohio), aff'd, 746 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated sub nom., Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace
Corp., 107 S.Ct. 1949 (1987).
29. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 756-57.
30. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979). Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1420 (W.D. Mo. 1985). See also
Langevoort, State Tender Offer Regulation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 250-53 (1977).
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relationship between the tender offeror and the shareholder of the
target corporation by giving the state, incumbent management or
other shareholders veto power over a shareholder's decision to sell
shares to a tender offeror.
B.

COMMERCE CLAUSE

Pre-CTS federal courts relied most heavily upon the Commerce
Clause to strike down anti-takeover laws. These courts were reluctant
to impune the motives of the state legislatures and strike down antitakeover legislation as illegally protectionist per se. Rather, these
3
courts used the balancing test outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc."
and examined whether anti-takeover laws imposed burdens on interstate commerce that were "clearly excessive in relation to the putative
32
local benefits."
State anti-takeover laws rarely survived such scrutiny. Their
chilling effect on the market for corporate control and thus on
interstate commerce is unquestioned." In contrast, there was little to
weigh in the state's balance. States cannot stem the flow of interstate
commerce by insulating resident corporations from the interstate
market for corporate control.3 4 Even though protection of the shareholders of resident corporations is a legitimate state interest, the
courts discounted the benefits to the state weighed in the Pike balance
by the fact that most of the shareholders of the resident corporations
of any state are typically non-residents.35 Courts also concluded that
the pro-management bias of state anti-takeover laws and their deterthe shareholder protections
rence of hostile tender offers contradicted
6
such laws purportedly offered.
31. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
32. Id. at 142.
33. See Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federaland State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & EcoN 371 (1980). In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Court recognized this chilling effect:
Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a
premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued

use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered.
The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management
to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.
Id. at 643.
34. Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2453 (1986).

35. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th

Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) ("Indiana has no interest in protecting the
residents of Connecticut from being stampeded to tender their shares [at a premium]"). 794 F.2d at 263.
36. Shareholders of target corporations typically reap substantial premiums
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The federal judiciary's approach to state anti-takeover legislation
prior to CTS was grounded on a solid understanding of the absence
of an internal political check on protectionist legislation at the state
level. These courts often described the legislative history of the antitakeover law before them in a way that made evident their understanding that local business interests had pushed through the legislation to
deter hostile takeover bids in order to protect the management of
major local corporations.17
The federal judiciary was not irresponsibly hostile, however, to
state legislation regulating takeovers. For example, one federal court
upheld state legislation that required acquirors to provide more complete disclosures to the shareholders of the target corporation about
the nature and intentions of the acquiror and the local impact of the
proposed takeover.3" Another court rejected a Commerce Clause
challenge to a state statute that applied to a tender offer for unregistered securities that was not subject to federal disclosure requirements .9
The Supreme Court, in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,40 gave muted
support to the approach of the lower federal courts on state antitakeover laws. The Court's analysis paralleled that of the lower courts.
While only a plurality of the Court supported Justice White's preemption analysis and only a bare majority struck down the Illinois
anti-takeover law on Commerce Clause grounds, three members of
the Court, two from the liberal wing and one from the conservative
wing, never reached the merits of the case.4 ' Post-MITE courts
undoubtedly assumed that at least some of these three Justices approved of the approach of the lower federal courts to state antitakeover laws.
Thus, at the time states such as Indiana began adopting control
share acquisition statutes, the federal judiciary had developed a
consistent approach to state anti-takeover legislation that was based
from the sale of their shares to a hostile tender offeror. See Bradley, Interfirm Tender

Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. L. 345 (1980).

37. See, e.g., Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (bid
for TWA prompted Missouri legislature to pass anti-takeover legislation in a matter
of days). See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Corp., 432 U.S. 333,
352 (1977) (noting evidence that resident beneficiaries of statute pushed through
legislation that disadvantaged non-resident competitors).
38. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
39. See L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985).
40. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
41. See 457 U.S. at 665 (Marshall, Brennan J.J., dissenting); 457 U.S. at 664
(Rehnquist J., dissenting).
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on a well-defined legal methodology under the Williams Act and the
Commerce Clause. The courts had protected the national markets in
securities and corporate control, but had upheld supplementary state
legislation that did not unduly deter takeovers.
Control share acquisition statutes were especially vulnerable to
such judicial scrutiny. In practice, control share acquisition statutes
(1) decisively favor incumbent management by delaying and complicating tender offers; (2) subvert investor autonomy by subjecting the
individual shareholder's decision to sell shares to the approval of
other shareholders; and (3) offer little if any protection to shareholders
while denying shareholders sizeable tender offer premiums. 42 Consequently, every federal court to review control share acquisition legislation prior to CTS had struck down such legislation as
43
unconstitutional.
V.

CTS

ERRONEOUSLY WEAKENED THE FEDERAL CHECK ON THE

POLITICAL IMPERFECTIONS THAT UNDERLIE PROTECTIONIST STATE
ANTI-TAKEOVER LEGISLATION

With the CTS decision, the Supreme Court shattered the consensus among the lower federal courts with respect to state anti-takeover
legislation. In the process of upholding Indiana's Control Share
Acquisition Chapter, the Court dismantled the highly effective check
the federal judiciary had placed on protectionist state anti-takeover
legislation.
A.

COMMERCE CLAUSE

The Court's Commerce Clause analysis. was especially disturbing.
Prior to CTS, the Court carefully considered the practical impact on
interstate commerce of legislation challenged on Commerce Clause
grounds. 44 The CTS Court, in contrast, accepted without analysis
Indiana's post hoc characterization of the Control Share Acquisition
42. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir.
1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) ("very few tender offers could run the gauntlet
that Indiana has set up").
43. Id.; Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986),

vacated sub nom., Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); Gelco
Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986); Terry v. Yamashita,
643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
622 F. Supp. 1216 (D.C. Minn. 1985); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo.

1985).

44. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 37 (1980).
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Chapter as a shareholder protection measure. 45 The Court also refused
to recognize the chilling effect of the Chapter on interstate markets. 46
In addition, even though the Court has maintained that protectionist legislation is unlawful per se,4 7 in CTS it ignored clear evidence
of protectionist intent. 48 The Chapter Was passed after non-residents
had made bids for two major Indiana corporations. 49 The drafter of
the Indiana Chapter had been quoted as stating that the purpose of
the Chapter was to prevent non-residents from acquiring Indiana
corporations.5 0 Moreover, in its Supreme Court brief the State of
Indiana admitted that the Chapter was designed to prevent the removal
of corporations from Indiana. 1
Also absent from the Court's opinion is any acknowledgement
of the imbalance of political forces at the state level that makes
protectionist state anti-takeover legislation almost inevitable.12 In prior
Commerce Clause cases the Court had pointed to a protectionist
alignment of political forces as an important factor in prompting the
Court to strike down legislation on Commerce Clause grounds. 3 By
failing to acknowledge the lack of an internal political check on

protectionism in the Indiana Legislature, the Court avoided its con-

45. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
46. Id. at 1649. In contrast, in MITE, the Court had highlighted the delays
imposed on tender offers as a key vice of state anti-takeover legislation. MITE, 457
U.S. at 637-39. Delays permit management to implement potent anti-takeover defenses. Id. In CTS, however, the court paid no heed to the fact that the Chapter
imposed delays of at least three weeks and superimposed an expensive and timeconsuming proxy contest on every hostile tender offer. See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v.
Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 756-758 (S.D. Ohio (1986), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th
Cir. 1986), vacated sub nom., Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987).
47. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). See generally, Regan,

The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986).

48. The Supreme Court has been criticized sharply for its lack of candor in
ignoring the protectionist purpose of the Indiana Chapter. See Langevoort, The

Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HAv. L. REV. 96 (1987).
49. New York Takeover Statute's First Progeny, 3 CORP. CONTROL ALERT 1,

10 (Mar. 1986).
50. Id.

51. Brief for Appellant at 37-39, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
52. In contrast, Justice White's dissent noted the trend toward such protectionist
legislation. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1654 (White J., dissenting). See also South Carolina
State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2 (1938).
53. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984).
See also Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978).
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stitutional responsibility to preserve national markets from undue
state infringement.
The CTS Court's deference to the State and its refusal to acknowledge the existence of unchecked protectionist pressures at the
state level suggests that the Court may soon repudiate the Pike
balancing test. Pike has been roundly criticized as an unseemly judicial
intrusion into the policy choices made by state legislatures.5 4 Even
critics of Pike, however, recognize that the federal judiciary must
systematically infringe upon the
intervene in instances when states
55
operation of national markets.
B.

WILLIAMS ACT

CTS' preemption analysis is similarly flawed by the Court's undue
deference to Indiana's self-serving characterization of the Chapter as
a shareholder protection measure. 6 The purported similarity in the
ends of the Indiana Chapter and the Williams Act blinded the Court
to the direct conflict between the means used by the two statutes.
Clearly favoring the interests of target company management over
those of offerors, the Chapter tips the level playing field between
management and tender offerors that Congress established in the
Williams Act. Nor did the Court consider how the paternalistic
character of the Indiana Chapter directly conflicts with the Williams
Act's principle of investor autonomy by conditioning an investor's
sale of shares to a tender offeror on the approval of the other
shareholders.
The Court offered no solid reason for dismantling the highly
effective federal judicial check on protectionist state anti-takeover
legislation. The Court appeared to have acted with reflexive distaste57
toward federal limits on state regulation of resident corporations
and without an appreciation of the forces that pressure state legislatures to enact restrictive limits on the interstate. market for corporate
control. Most fundamentally, the Court did not give due regard to
the importance of open national markets to the prosperity and political
stability of the nation.
54. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YAE L.J.
425, 441-43, 482 (1982).
55. Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
125 (1979).

56. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
57. See Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1975). See also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1

(1985).
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The undesirable consequences of the CTS decision have been
quickly realized. Numerous states have adopted new anti-takeover
measures. 58 Some of these laws are even more protectionist than the
Indiana Chapter. In most cases, the legislation was pushed through
the state legislature by a major local corporation which was trying to
thwart a takeover bid that may well have benefitted shareholders and
consumers nationwide? 9
The chilling effort of these anti-takeover statutes on the market
for corporate control will be felt for many years now that the Court
has largely dismantled the federal judicial check on protectionist state
anti-takeover legislation. Competition for corporate charters and investment among states will encourage states to enact even more
restrictive legislation until the Court is prompted to intervene, 60 Con58. Pamepinto & Heard, New State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers, Nat.

L.J., Sept. 21, 1987, at 26, col. 1. At least fourteen states currently have control
share acquisition statutes. See Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to 121217 (Supp. 1987); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.109 (West Supp. 1988); Hawaii,
HAwAi IREv. STAT. §§ 416-171 to 416-172 (1985); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-142 (West Supp. 1987); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. AN N. §§ 12:135 to 12:140.2 (West
Supp. 1987); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110C, §§1 to 13 (West
Supp. 1987); Minnesota, MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1988); Missouri,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 78.376
to 78.3793 (1985 & Supp. 1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to 5598 (Supp. 1987); Ohio, Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145 to 1155 (West Supp. 1987); 1987 Or. Laws ch.
820, §§ 1 to 11; Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1987). In
addition, on February 2, 1988, the Delaware Legislature adopted an anti-takeover
statute that limits the ability of a hostile acquiror to engage in a business combination
with the target company. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988). See RP
Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., Civil Action No. 88-190-JRR (D. Del.
May 9, 1988). At least three bills are pending in the Illinois legislature that would
add a control share acquisition statute to the Illinois Business Corporation Act. For
a review and critique of these bills see Sachnoff, Bamonte & Kaprelian, Resisting the
Race to the Bottom: Why the Illinois Legislature Should Reject New Anti-Takeover

Laws, ILL. B.J. (forthcoming in June, 1988).

59. Pamepinto & Heard, New State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers, Nat.

L.J., Sept. 21, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
60.. For example, the Court might limit the scope of CTS by allowing states to
enforce only anti-takeover laws which, like the Indiana Chapter, apply only to
resident corporations with a significant local presence. The lower federal courts have
tended to read CTS narrowly. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners v. Connelly, 1988 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 93,619, at 97,792 (1st Cir. Feb. 4, 1988) (striking down
Massachusetts Takeover Bid Regulation Act); Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dept.
Stores, 1988 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 93,650, at 97,984 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 1988)
(striking down Ohio Foreign Business Acquisitions Act); TLX Acquisition Corp. v.
Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (striking down control share
acquisition statute that applied to non-resident corporations).
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gress preempts state anti-takeover legislation, 6' or hostile takeover
bids are thwarted in sufficient numbers that no further state restrictions are necessary. 62
VI.

CONCLUSION

Various unchecked political pressures drive state legislatures to
adopt protectionist anti-takeover legislation aimed at so-called hostile
tender offers. Such legislation harms the national economy by restricting the transfer of control over corporate assets and offends the
constitutionally protected principle of open national markets. Prior
to CTS, the federal courts had developed a high degree of unanimity
in their approach to state anti-takeover legislation under the Williams
Act and the Commerce Clause. CTS shattered this judicial consensus
and has encouraged states to race to enact tough anti-takeover laws
that will substantially lessen the liquidity of the national market for
corporate control. This unfortunate development represents a step
toward the balkanization of the national economy. Given that important national markets in corporate control, securities and assets are
at stake, Congress should preempt state anti-takeover legislation. Until
Congress acts, the courts should read CTS narrowly.

61. Among others, the Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission has
urged Congress to preempt state anti-takeover laws. 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
1383 (1987).
62. If hostile takeover activity declines, then anti-takeover legislation will be of
less value to management, reducing the pressures on states to enact such legislation.

In Defense of State

Takeover Laws
THEODORE

I.

W.

GRIPPO*

INTRODUCTION

Proponents of state takeover legislation were given new hope by
the United States Supreme Court in its recent decision in CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America.' The Court clarified much of the
confusion that resulted from its 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE
Corp.,2 which struck down the Illinois Business Take-Over Act.' Most
observers viewed MITE as the death-knell for all state takeover
legislation. Nonetheless, in response to an urgent need for such
legislation, state lawmakers persisted in attempting to formulate effective regulations. Since 1982, a number of states have enacted a
variety of second and third generation statutes, 4 though in view of
*

Partner, Grippo & Elden, Chicago, Illinois. B.S., Georgetown University;

J.D., Northwestern University Law School; LL.M., DePaul College of Law. Former
Illinois Securities Commissioner.
This paper is an updated compilation of presentations made during 1987 by Mr.
Grippo to various committees of the Illinois Legislature, the Illinois Secretary of
State's Business Advisory Committee, the Chicago Bar Association's Corporation
Law Committee, and the Legislative Committee of the Illinois Municipal League.
This paper is an abridged version of Mr. Grippo's article entitled "MITE Made
Right" which appeared in the November 1987 issue of the Illinois Bar Journal.
1. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
2. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.50 to 137.70 (1981), repealed by Act
No. 83-365, 1983 Il1. Legis. Serv. 2628 (West).
4. The following states have adopted the control share acquisition type of
statute: Arizona, Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to 10-1217 (Supp. 1987); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.109 (West Supp. 1988); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 416171 to 416-172 (1985); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987);
Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135 to 12:140.2 (West Supp. 1987); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IOC, §§ I to 13 (West Supp. 1987); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 78.376 to 78.3793 (1985
& Supp. 1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to 55-98 (Supp. 1987);
Ohio, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (West Supp. 1988); 1987 Or. Laws ch. 820, §§ I to 11; Wisconsin,
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MITE, most were of questionable constitutionality and were looked
upon with disfavor by the lower federal courts.' The six-justice
majority in CTS v. Dynamics, in a strong opinion upholding the
Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter, 6 has given vitality and
impetus to state takeover legislation throughout the United States.
This paper describes the major players in takeover fights, certain
gaps in the federal law and the resulting abuses that have occurred in
connection with the transactions. Finally, state takeover laws are
reviewed and new takeover proposals under consideration by the 1987

WIS. STAT. ANN.

§ 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1987).

The following states have adopted the fair price type statute: Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to 33-374c (West 1987); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.108 (West Supp. 1988); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to 14-2-235
(Supp. 1987); Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985); Kentucky, Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396 to 271A.398 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Louisiana,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:131 to 12:134 (West Supp. 1988); Maryland, MD. CoRPs.
& Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1987); Michigan, MICH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1776 to 450.1784 (West Supp. 1987); Mississippi, MIss. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to 79-25-7 (Supp. 1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5575 to 55-79 (Supp. 1987); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1
(Purdon Supp. 1987); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to 13.1-728 (1985);
Washington, WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988); Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1987).
The following states have adopted the five-year freeze-out type statute: Arizona,
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to 10-1223 (Supp. 1987); Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43 (West Supp.
1987); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1988); New Jersey, N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 14A:IOA-I to
14A:1OA-6 (West Supp. 1987); New York, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney
1986); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988).
The following states have adopted the control share cash-out type statute: Maine,
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1987); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-76.5
(Supp. 1987).
5. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated
sub nom., Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987) (Ohio statute);
Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (Hawaii statute); APL Ltd.
Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D.C. Minn. 1985) (Minnesota
statute); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri statute);
Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma
statute); Telvest Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute);
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan
statute); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Missouri statute).
6. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).
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Session of the Illinois General Assembly are examined in light of this
recent Supreme Court development.
II.

CORPORATE MARKET OVERVIEW

Corporations are generally governed by the sensible rule that
those with the most invested in the enterprise should be allowed to
direct its actions. 7 Thus, while minority shareholders may have certain
protections which assure them a voice in corporate affairs, management is ordinarily controlled by those owning the most stock in the
corporation. The controlling shareholders can elect directors, determine who gets remunerative management jobs, and establish corporate
policy.' The principle of shareholder democracy, where a majority
vote is the primary vehicle for establishing corporate policy, is entirely
consistent with notions fundamental to our society, such as fair play
and orderly change.
It is right and proper that majority owners be allowed to exercise
their will on corporate matters. Since ultimately it is their investment
at stake, majority shareholders should be the ones who not only bear
the burden of poor decisions, but also the ones who reap the benefits
of good decisions. The corporation is the property of the shareholders.
The right to change indolent or ineffective management and to protect
their property must be in the exclusive domain of equity ownership.
This conforms with the views of a noted group of commentators,
several of whom have recently been appointed to the federal judiciary. 9
They subscribe to the "efficient capital market" theory, which states
that economic efficiency should be the sole rationale for a corporation's existence and development. 10 The premise is that people who
value a piece of property more, as reflected by their willingness to
pay a greater amount for a share in that entity than other investors,

1983).

7. HENN &

ALEXANDER,

LAW

oF CORPORATIONS § 189, at 439-501 (3rd ed.

8. Id. § 188, at 490-92.
9. This group centers around The University of Chicago Law School. It
popularized a school of economic thought that explored the economic underpinnings
of the common law, and many other social and political institutions. Two University
of Chicago Law School professors, Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, are now
judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Easterbrook

& Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender

Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1981); Fischel, Efficient CapitalMarket Theory,
the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
TEx. L. REv. 1, 2 (1978).
10. See supra note 9.
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ought to possess it. According to the theory, a bidder who is willing
to pay a premium for stock over the going rate should always succeed.
This maximizes shareholder wealth and causes control of the corporation to spiral up to an owner who cares more about the asset and
will make better decisions concerning its use. Should the corporation
remain in the hands of owners who value it less, indicated by lower
stock prices, there would be inefficiency and a decrease in social
utility. In this regard, defensive measures against takeovers are viewed
as an evil since they tend to impede the transfer of property to a
higher bidder, who will put that property to its optimal use in order
to support the higher price paid.
Although this theory is appealing, it does not show the entire
picture. Economic efficiency in the stock market is not the only
measure of a society's well-being. It is just as clear that a vast web
of personal and contractual relationships, expectations, and responsibilities grows around a corporation. Indeed, a particular corporate
entity often forms the hub around which an entire community revolves. Thus, while a corporation can be characterized as the sum of
its properties, it is "wrong to assume that corporate control can
change hands with no greater concern about the consequences than
accompanies an exchange of property deeds in a game of Monopoly."" Also, the theory assumes that a "perfect market" exists in
which there are unlimited buyers and sellers, each with unlimited
resources and complete information about the stock they are trading.
From this, comes the conclusion that the market will accurately reflect
the value of the company and its future prospects. As we know, the
' 2
market is not "perfect.'
Nevertheless, there is a consensus that a company whose assets
are underutilized due to poor management should be a legitimate
target for a takeover. By taking advantage of the company's depressed
stock prices, a well-intentioned bidder may be able to gain control of
the company and restructure it or install more effective management.
This use of the takeover mechanism is constructive and should not be
deterred by either federal or state laws, so long as the process is fair
to all shareholders. A fair process should include a disclosure of the
impact of the offer, a fair price for all shares, and freedom from the
11. Speech by Chairman Harold M. Williams, Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Seventh Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 17, 1980).
12. See Melloan, The Takeover Wars: New Debate Over CorporateGovernance,
Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1986, at 36, col. 3, and Melloan, The Takeover Wars: The
Backlash Against Corporate Raiders, Wall. St. J., Nov. 12, 1986, at 32, col. 3, for
a recent exposition of these arguments.
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coercive effects of the two-tiered tender offer. However, the federal
laws do not impose, nor does the corporate raider comply, with these
standards. Moreover, the raider is often just that, a professional
raider and not a professional manager. The efficient capital market
theory tends to break down when control of a target corporation
passes to those who simply seek a quick profit, rather than to those
who have the business acumen necessary to guide the corporation and
deploy its assets efficiently and intelligently.
The effects of corporate takeovers, however, extend beyond
replacing management. The severe, almost violent after-shocks can be
stunning, as victors in battles for corporate control are apt to liquidate
the corporation, sell off its key assets, merge the target into some
incompatible organization, or force minority shareholders out altogether. These activities may result in severe and adverse consequences
to many Illinois communities dependent upon the stable and continued
operations of such corporations.
Illinois residents saw first hand how a hostile takeover can
adversely effect an entire community. 3 In the summer of 1984, the
Frantz Manufacturing Company, headquartered in Sterling, Illinois,
was the subject of a hostile takeover attempt. Frantz was the classic
example of an attractive and vulnerable takeover target; the company's
balance sheet was essentially debt free, it possessed approximately $8
million in cash and liquid assets, and its operations were profitable.
EAC Industries, Inc. was a Chicago company laden with $6.8
million in long-term debt and expecting negative earnings for that
1 0 of Frantz common stock
fiscal year. EAC secretly acquired 2.3%
for
cash on the open market, and devised a plan to line up for purchase
another 48.6%'0 owned by a limited number of shareholders. EAC
chose this method based on the belief that since it did not actually
complete the purchase of 5% or more of Frantz's stock, it was not
required to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC and with the company,
disclosing to the public its holdings and the reasons underlying its
purchases. EAC intended to eventually merge Frantz into EAC and
force minority shareholders to accept EAC common stock in consideration of their own Frantz stock. Following the merger, EAC planned
to use Frantz's cash and the proceeds from a sale of Frantz's assets
to reduce its own accumulated debt. If this had occurred, hundreds
of jobs would have been lost in Sterling.
13. The following description is taken from the complaint filed in litigation

relating to these matters, Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., No. Civ-85-5105 (N.D.

Ill. 1985). See also Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (1985).
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In just one day, EAC gathered the group of potential sellers it
had lined up earlier and executed definitive agreements to purchase
the 48.6% of Frantz common stock which, together with the 2.3% it
already owned, gave EAC majority control. Thus, EAC avoided
informing Frantz, shareholders, and the public of its control until the
shift had already been accomplished. Due to gaps and deficiencies in
the federal securities laws, a raider was able to secretly acquire 51%
of the stock of Frantz, and then deadlock the board, before any
notice to the public or the company was made indicating that a shift
of control had occurred.
To protect the company and its shareholders, Frantz was forced
into heavy litigation which lasted for over seven months. The litigation
was eventually settled with Frantz agreeing to buy EAC's holdings
for a handsome premium. Ultimately, Frantz spent close to $26 million
in order to buy out the raider, maintain its independence, and save
local jobs. As a result, none of these funds could be used for expansion
or development of Frantz's productive resources.
These are the effects of the gaps and inequities in the existing
federal law. The Frantz case only hints of the widespread problem.
Far-reaching and exotic defensive techniques, a patchwork of state
legislation, and an overloading of the courts with suits to enjoin
takeovers are all results of the structural defects in the federal scheme.
III.

THE INADEQUACIES OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION

In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act as a response to a
4
quantum leap in the number of takeovers and takeover attempts.
The goal of the Williams Act was to provide investors with adequate
information when called upon to make an investment decision regarding a shift in control of the issuer.' 5 The Williams Act requires
disclosure of information about, among other things, the corporate
suitor, 6 his source of funds, 7 his current holdings in the target, 8 and
the purpose of the acquisition.' 9 There are, however, several deficien-

14. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15
U.S.C. 78m-n (1964), current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) & (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1986).
15. The Williams Act was designed to provide full and fair disclosure for the
benefit of investors in the context of both tender offers and certain non-tender offer
acquisitions of stock. 113 CoNG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1986).

17. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(B).

18. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(D).

19. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(C).
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cies in the Williams Act which create loopholes for sophisticated
raiders and dilute the protections of federal law.
Under the Williams Act, any person who acquires five percent
or more of a publicly traded company must file a Schedule 13D
information statement with the SEC and the company no later than
10 days after acquisition . 20 There are no restrictions against a raider
obtaining as much stock as he can during this ten-day "window"
between crossing the five percent threshold and filing. Thus, for ten
days, the company, the public, and selling shareholders may be totally
unaware that a major shift in control is occurring.
It may be unusual for a raider to purchase 51% of a target's
stock in the ten-day window, but the raider need not obtain a
mathematical majority of stock to affect control of the target. A de
facto shift in control may occur when a single person or group owns
substantially less than 51% of the stock. 21 In furtherance of the goals
of the Williams Act, all shareholders ought to be alerted to a possible
shift in control, and they should be provided with material information about the new controlling person or group.
Another loophole is created by ambiguity about when a raider
actually owns stock of a target. The Williams Act defines "ownership" fairly broadly, 22 though clever raiders have found methods to
further their acquisition efforts while avoiding the kind of transactions
that should trigger a Williams Act filing. A raider can, in complete
secrecy, arrange to line up for purchase as much stock of a target as
he can so long as he postpones actually buying it or executing a
contract. The law needs to conclusively establish that when a raider
reaches an understanding in principle to buy stock or to obtain the
benefits of ownership, he should be treated as the beneficial owner
of those shares for purposes of the required disclosure. 23 When the
parties reach an understanding, the law should not allow the raider
20. Id. § 78m(d).
21. Illinois securities laws define a "controlling person" as any person or
persons acting in concert who own 25% or more of the issued and outstanding shares
of an issuer, where no other person owns a greater percentage of shares. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.2-4 (1985). Indeed, in England, ownership of 300%6 is
considered to represent sufficient control that the acquiror must proceed with a cash
offer to purchase the remaining shares of the issuer. See Rule 34 of The City Code
on Take-overs and Mergers (rev. 1981).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1986).

23. See also Heard on the Street: Raiders' Activities Revive Memories of 1920's

Pools, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 47, col. 1, which discusses the likelihood that
raiders buy stock through different companies and ask associates to "warehouse"

the stock for them, which allows the raider to operate an undisclosed pool of stock.
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to do with a wink and a nod that which he could not do with an
executed contract.
Although the Williams Act is primarily a disclosure statute, it
does not require that the acquiror provide information of the impact
of his actions on the interests of local constituencies. Not only does
this prevent shareholders from accurately determining what effect
selling their shares will have on such constituencies, it also prevents
the directors of target corporations from performing their duties. The
courts have recognized that part of a director's fiduciary duty is to
resist takeovers which are not in the best interests of the company.
Included in the "best interests of the company" calculus is the effect24
of the takeover on local interests, as they relate to the shareholders.
Without complete disclosure, neither shareholders nor directors can
make intelligent decisions with respect to the takeover, whether it is
accomplished through a tender offer, or through open market or
private purchases.
Finally, current law provides only corrective disclosure as a
remedy for a violation of Section 13(d). 25 This is a hollow victory for
the target's shareholders who face the fait accompli of a raider's
illegal strike, since the raider is permitted to keep his spoils. In many
cases, this remedy will result in the raider only having to tell the
shareholders what they have already found out: that control or
substantial stock ownership has shifted, and that some other radical
change in corporate structure is imminent. Once the raider achieves a
shift in control through a violation of the Act, a remedy should
restore the target's shareholders to the position they held originally.
IV.

TAKEOVERS

Corporate takeovers have become an unruly high stakes game in
which a vulnerable company is often defeated before a defense is even
possible. The result is a recurring tragedy where well run companies
are besieged to the detriment of their shareholders, employees and
communities.

24. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
("[E]xamples of such concerns may include: . .. the impact on 'constituencies' other
than shareholders (i.e. creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally... )"). Id. at 955. In addition, the takeover law of Pennsylvania
specifically authorizes directors, in the discharge of their fiduciary duties, to consider
''all pertinent factors." This is a much broader formulation of the director's role,
since the pertinent factors do not have to relate directly to shareholders.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (1986).

1988:2731

A.

STATE TAKEOVER LAWS: A DEFENSE

THE RAIDERS

The modern corporate raider 26 is often an extremely sophisticated
market analyst who utilizes the services of investment bankers, lawyers, accountants and computerized data bases to identify and subdue
corporations which are target opportunities. Often, the raider is just
that-a professional raider and not a professional manager. The
"efficient capital market" theory tends to break down when we
consider that control of a target corporation may devolve to those
who simply have access to capital markets (for example, the increasing
use of subinvestment grade "junk bonds") and who can afford to
pay for corporate control, rather than to those who have the business
acumen necessary to guide the corporation and deploy its assets
efficiently and intelligently.
These professional raiders move with ruthless efficiency to exploit
what they perceive to be imperfections in the market which have
undervalued a target company's stock. Their goals are for the most
part centered on short-term profits; they are "paper entrepreneurs"
whose focus is on financial gain for themselves rather than economic
expansion. 27 Though many argue that raiders increase shareholder
wealth, takeover tactics such as "greenmail ' 2 and the coercive "twotiered tender offer ' 29 attest to the raider's insensitivity to the welfare

26. The person or company seeking to gain ownership control of another
company is called a "raider." A raider can achieve a takeover by a proxy contest or
by a tender offer. The tender offer is the more popular takeover method. There are
two types of tender offers, a cash tender offer and a public exchange offer. A cash
tender offer is an invitation to the shareholders of the target company to tender their
shares to the raider in exchange for a premium cash price. The raider states in its
tender offer how many shares it seeks to purchase, an amount that will at least give
the raider a working control of the target company. A public exchange is essentially
the same, except that instead of offering cash in exchange for the shares, the raider
offers a package comprised of debt and/or equity. Effectively, the raider gives the
tendering shareholders an interest in itself in exchange for their interest in the target
company.
27. See Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers, 83 COLUM. L.
REv. 249, 310 (1983).
28. "Greenmail" is a payment made by a target corporation to repurchase its
own shares from a hostile acquiror, typically with a substantial profit to the raider.
Greenmail is so offensive that some corporations have enacted charter provisions to
prohibit its use.
29. A "two-tiered tender offer" occurs when a raider, in the first stage, acquires
a simple majority of the shares in the target company through a successful offer.
Subsequently, in the second stage, the raider will use its majority ownership to vote
a merger of the target into a corporation which is already controlled by the raider.
Minority shareholders of the target are "squeezed out" by forcing them to accept a
lower price for their shares than what was offered during the first age acquisition.
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of the target's shareholders. For these opportunistic raiders, the target
company is simply a pot of gold; often the raiders care nothing for
the target's importance to its employees or to the local community.
There is something fundamentally wrong with a system that encourages such a vast concentration of capital in takeover activities that
often serve no productive purpose.
B.

ARBITRAGEURS

Another set of players in the contest for corporate control are
the arbitrageurs who speculate in the stock market. Once rumors of
a takeover spring up, the arbitrageurs start acquiring shares of the
target on the open market. While their interest in the company is
motivated by nothing more than a computer blip, this class of investor
often acquires substantial amounts of equity in the target. The fate
of the company is thus delivered into the hands of speculators who
will unquestioningly sell out once the tender offer is announced. They
then move on to the next opportunity for easy gains without regard
to the ultimate fate of the acquired company and the many constituencies surrounding it.
A growing scandal is tainting the practice of arbitrage. Ivan
Boesky was recently forced by the SEC to disgorge $50 million in
profits and pay $50 million in fines as a result of trades he made on
inside information.3 ° In conjunction with the Boesky investigation,
subpoenas have been issued to investment bankers and arbitrage
traders. Since inside information is often exchanged through inside
trading rings or networks, more abuses are certain to appear. An
example of such a ring is the one between Boeskey and Dennis B.
Levine, also under investigation, who allegedly had a specific agreement to trade on what they knew was illegal insider information.'
While not all arbitrageurs rely on privileged corporate information, it
is clear that a significant number of traders are using a "marked
deck" to obtain unimaginable profits at the expense of honest investors and corporations.
In addition, recent years have seen increasing amounts of the
stock of public companies held by institutional investors. Once the
target is put into play by the raider, institutions invariably opt for
30. See Fall of Ivan F. Boesky Leads to Broader Probe of Insider Information,
Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 5; Boesky's Rise and Fall Illustrate a Compulsion
to Profit by Getting Inside Track on Market, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 28, col.
1.

31. See supra note 30.
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quick profit. The institutions have no loyalty to the company; indeed,
they consider no factors other than the benefit to their own portfolios.
C.

THE TARGETS

There appear to be three major types of takeover settings:
(1)takeovers of the poorly-managed company; (2)takeovers which have
become abusive; and (3)takeovers which victimize the well-managed
company.
There is a consensus that the company whose assets are underutilized, due to poor management, should be a legitimate target for a
takeover. By taking advantage of the company's depressed stock
prices, a well-intentioned acquiror may be able to gain control of the
company and restructure it or install more effective management. In
doing so, the acquiror will reap profits for himself, as the stock prices
increase to reflect better use of the company's assets, and will promote
efficiency in the nation's economy. This type of takeover is constructive and should not be deterred by either federal or state laws, so
long as the process is fair to all shareholders. A fair process should
include no less than adequate information, a fair price for all shares,
and freedom from the coercive efforts of the two-tiered offer.
Then, there are takeovers which are conducted in an abusive and
wasteful manner. In these cases, the directors and management of
corporations lose sight of the business context of the transaction, and
engage in economic warfare long after any useful purpose would be
served by such perseverance. Use of corporate assets to sustain this
battle suggests that shareholders of those corporations suffer at the
expense, of management's personal agenda.
A third takeover victim is the conservatively managed company
which has eschewed long-term debt financing of its operations and
whose management has not locked up large blocks of stock. If, in
addition, incumbent management has emphasized long-range stability
and growth over immediate return on investment, it is likely that the
trading price of the company's stock will not reflect its long-term
value or "bust-up" price (the price which a seller could command by
selling separate portions of the company). This is because such a
stock is not likely to be either heavily traded or to command the
attention of short-term investors. The combination of undervalued
stock, liquid assets and low debt will almost always lead to takeover
interest.
Poorly managed companies should be subject to market discipline
so that corrections can be made. But, there are too many examples
in the national and local economies of what were once well-managed
companies being left with the burden of heavy debt incurred to buy
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out the raider, in order to retain their independence and operate in

their local communities. At the same time, the raider walks away
richer after receiving the benefits of greenmail tactics.
It is common knowledge that many raiders and speculators are

able to manipulate the market by taking a beachload position in the

target and forcing 'management into a leveraged buyout or another
greenmail transaction. As discussed earlier, the SEC is investigating
individuals and networks which engage in such manipulative activities.
D.

THE DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES

The financial pages in recent years have been filled with exotic
defensive strategies, such as "shark repellent, ' 3 2 "golden parachutes," 3 3 "fat-man, 3 4 "white knight,"" "pac-man, ' 3 6 and an everincreasing variety of poison pills: flip in, flip out, flip over, debt pills,
32. It may be possible to amend the charter or bylaws to make the corporation
a less attractive target. Such "shark repellant" or "porcupine" amendments often
require that a supermajority vote of the shareholders approve certain types of business
combinations which have not been agreed to by the board. Alternatively, the charter
may provide for a staggered board, or otherwise insulate the board from rapid
turnover by allowing removal only in narrowly defined cases. The company will be
a less attractive target if a potential bidder will be unable to take control of the
board for several years after the acquisition.
33. "Golden parachutes" are either modifications of existing employment
contracts or separate employment agreements that provide for special payments, or
a continuation of salary and benefits, to executives when their company is subject to
a change of control. Labor unions are also beginning to press for substantial severance
benefits for their members in the event of an acquisition. These have become known
as "tin parachutes."
34. The so-called "fat-man" defense involves the target company acquiring
poorly performing assets to decrease its short-term value to a potential acquirer, or
embarking on an acquisition spree of companies which compete with the raider,
regardless of their intrinsic worth to the target, so that the takeover will be blocked
by antitrust considerations. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Fields Co., 486 F. Supp.
1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
35. A "white knight" is a friendly third-party investor sought out by target
management. When target management is faced with a takeover threat, a defensive
measure may be to attract a white knight to acquire a significant number of shares
in the target company, thereby precluding the raider making the hostile takeover
from ever obtaining control of the target company. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1981).
36. The "pac-man" defense, named for a popular video game, involves the
target company making a takeover bid for shares of the original offeror. The target
defends against the takeover by trying to take over the raider. By becoming the
aggressor, the target company may dissuade the raider from pursuing its bid or may
even obtain control of the raider. See, e.g., Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,
690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
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and stock pills. 7 In addition, there have been, in the aggregate, over
60 versions of state takeover laws which fill the statute books with
fair-price provisions, supermajority voting requirements, and control
share acquisition guidelines. Most recently, the New York Stock
Exchange announced that it would seek SEC approval to determine
whether the Exchange's 100-year-old rule of "one share, one vote"
ought to be changed to allow certain classes of stockholders, loyal to
the issuer, to control the voting power.3"
Why have management, state legislators, and the major stock
exchanges become so preoccupied with these defensive provisions? To
be sure, some of these strategies may be used to preserve the jobs
and egos of unproductive managers. But in a great many other cases,
these tactics and laws reveal an intense effort to achieve an equilibrium
against harmful takeover activities. This is perhaps the most compelling evidence that the existing federal legislation is deficient. These
measures are not merely theories debated among legal and economic
scholars; they are facts, they are empirical evidence that gaps exist in
the Williams Act which must somehow be corrected.
The need for reform is apparent. Rather than increasing productivity and generating new ideas, corporate resources are being diverted
to create elaborate schemes to acquire other companies and to stay
one step ahead of the raiders. The result is a carousel, in which the
players must move ever faster to take or be taken. Too often, this
serves only to dissipate capital in unproductive resources, rather than
employing calrital for growth. The present environment encourages
management to engage in unsound policies, such as prolific borrowing
and unseemly "hyping" of the company's stock, in order to ward off
raiders.
While in some cases, takeovers are the marketplace's vehicle for
replacing bad management, in many other cases takeovers are directed
at well-managed companies. Perversely, a liquid and conservatively
managed business may make an ideal takeover target, though a highly
37. A "poison pill" can take many forms, but in every case it acts as a negative

attribute of the target company which a raider would have to "swallow" should it
complete the takeover. Many times new securities are issued which create certain
rights in the event of a change in ownership of the target company. For example,
these rights can include an option to purchase additional stock at less than market
value or to exercise special voting or other rights. The intention of a poison pill
provision is to make a takeover so costly or unappealing to a raider that it will
decline to consummate the acquisition.
38. See generally Securities and Exchange Commission Hearing on Voting
Rights, Listing Standards and Disenfranchisement, July 22, 1987.
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leveraged and overvalued company will almost never be the object of
a hostile takeover.
V.

STATE LEGISLAnON

Many states have already recognized that there should be a role for
state legislation in this area.3 9 Corporate takeovers frequently effect
irreversible changes in the corporate ownership and structure of the
target, and are more than mere securities transactions. They are, in
fact, instruments of fundamental corporate change, and are therefore
a legitimate subject of state regulation. The "efficient capital market"
theory simply cannot be trusted to achieve a fair result in every case.
Absent adequate defenses, the neutrality philosophy of federal law
often delivers the target company into the hands of the raider.
Something more is needed to put the players on even footing.
The first generation of thirty-seven state takeover statutes was
invalidated in the pivotal ruling of Edgar v. MITE Corp.,4° in which
the Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute as unconstitutional
because it gave state officials overly broad discretion in determining4
whether a takeover could occur anywhere in the United States. '
Several Justices opined that the Illinois statute tipped the balance in
favor of the target, violating the neutrality principles of the federal
system.4 2 However, no clear rationale commanded a majority of the
Court4

3

and the Court in CTS v. Dynamics" declined to adhere to

39. The following states have adopted. the control share acquisition type of
statute: Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Wisconsin.
The following states have adopted the fair-price type of statute: Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
The following states have adopted the five-year freeze-out type of statute:
Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York and
Washington.
The following states have adopted the control cash-out type of statute: Maine,
Pennsylvania and Utah.
See supra note 4.
40. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
41. Id. at 644-45.
42. Writing for the Court, Justice White could secure the concurrence of only
then Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun on his position that the Illinois Act.
was preempted under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 631-40.
43. Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Powell each wrote separate concurring
opinions. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, and Justice Rehnquist, filed
separate opinions. Justice Powell provided the vote necessary to obtain a plurality in
this section of the opinion with the reservation: "I join Part V-B because its
Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for the state regulation of tender
offers." 457 U.S. at 646.
44. 107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987).
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the plurality opinion set out in MITE.45 Since MITE was handed
down in 1982, there has been a great deal of confusion among states
concerning the extent of their power to regulate takeover activity, and
the lower courts have been attempting to articulate standards in this
area.
Advocates of state takeover legislation enjoyed a resounding
victory in the CTS v. Dynamics case. In upholding Indiana's Control
Share Acquisition Chapter, 46 Justice Powell was joined by five other
justices who concluded that such legislation serves important state
interests and does not impermissibly interfere with the federal scheme
47
of securities regulation.
Currently, a substantial number of states have enacted second
and third generation statutes." Many of these statutes focus on what
typically is the second stage of a takeover, in which a raider who
owns a simple majority of shares in the target after a successful tender
offer may then vote to merge the target into a corporation which he
already controls and "squeeze out" minority shareholders of the
target by forcing them to accept a lower price for their shares or an
undesirable form of consideration (e.g., stock or debt instruments
with a lower cash value). Although the initial tender offer for 51%
may have been at a premium over the market price for the target's
stock, this two-tier tender offer technique allows the raider to achieve
complete ownership for an average price lower than the pre-tender
offer price. It generally results in a stampede of shareholders rushing
to sell their shares-at the offered premium if possible but by all
means prior to the subsequent squeeze-out merger. As a result, the
raider may acquire the target at an overall bargain price while fully,
even vigorously, complying with the requirements of federal law.
These second generation statutes vary from state to state, but
each has several key elements to achieve the common aim of protecting
minority shareholders from being squeezed out on the second step of
a two-tiered front-loaded offer.
VI.

ILLINOIS TAKEOVER ACT SHOULD FOLLOW INDIANA LAW

Since the first generation statute invalidated in MITE, legislators
in many states have been striving to formulate workable takeover

45. Id. at 1645.

46.

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).

47. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644-52.
48. See supra note 33.
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statutes. 49 In Illinois, a recent proposal was Senate Bill 803, which
was introduced for consideration in April of 1987 by Senator Calvin
W. Schuneman.50 This Bill set out a number of carefully tailored
provisions designed to offer protections to companies based in Illinois,
while still complying with the then murky requirements imposed by
various constitutional law doctrines." However, once the Indiana
Control Share Acquisition Chapter received the Supreme Court's
endorsement on April 21, 1987, the proponents of S.B. 803 determined
that the State's interests would be best served -by adopting that
statute.5 2 On May 6, 1987, Senator Schuneman offered an amendment
to S.B. 803 to conform the Bill to the Indiana statute . 3 Senate Bill
803, as amended, was referred to a subcommittee of the Finance
Committee of the Illinois Senate and the Bill died there when the
General Assembly adjourned on June 30.
Senate Bill 803 as amended, would have applied to any issuing
public corporation incorporated in Illinois that had: (1) one hundred
or more shareholders; (2) its principal place of business, or substantial
assets, located in Illinois; and (3) a substantial number of shareholders
54
who are residents of Illinois.
The proposed Illinois Act would apply whenever an entity acquires or could direct the voting power of shares that, but for the
operation of the Act, would bring its voting power to or above any
one of three "control share" thresholds: 20076, 33-1/3% and 50%. 55
Any entity that acquires control shares, i.e. sufficient shares to reach
any of the given thresholds, obtains voting rights in those shares only
if approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders of the
49. Following the CTS decision, there has been a flurry of activity among the
states, including Minnesota, North Carolina and Delaware. The State of Delaware
enacted a statute on February 2, 1988, which limits the ability of an acquiror to
engage in a business combination with the target company. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 203 (Supp. 1988).
50. S.B. 803, 85th Ill. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (Apr. 1987).
51. To correct defects in Williams Act, Senate Bill 803 as originally introduced
included proposals to clarify the definition of "beneficial ownership" to prevent
raiders from warehousing undisclosed pools of stock, closing the ten-day window
which allows raiders to obtain majority ownership without immediate disclosure, a
guaranteed fair price to shareholders of Illinois corporations who are faced with a
coercive "squeeze out" merger, and enhanced disclosure and remedy provisions.
52. All parties recognize that technical adjustments will have to be made to the
Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter so that it meshes with the other provisions
of the Illinois Business Corporation Act.
53. S.B. 803, 85th Ill. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (amended May 1987).
54. S.B. 803, 85th Il. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess., para. 11.04 (1987).
55. Id. at para. I1A.01.
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corporation.16 Disinterested shareholders are all shareholders other
than the acquiring entity, any officer of the issuing corporation, or
any employee who is also a director of the corporation.5 7 Any corporation otherwise covered by the Act can fully or partially opt out
of the Act to the extent provided in its articles of incorporation or
by-laws 58
Once the acquiror reaches any of the threshold levels of share
ownership, it may file a disclosure statement in which it can request
a meeting of the shareholders, so that the disinterested shareholders
may vote on whether to confer voting rights on the control shares
proposed to be acquired. 9 The acquiror can require management to
call a special meeting of the shareholders within 50 days if it agrees
to pay the expenses of the meeting. 60 If no such request is made,
disinterested shareholders may vote at their next regularly scheduled
meeting. 61 A new vote is required as, and if, the acquiror's holding
increase to reach each successive threshold level.
In the event control shares are accorded full voting rights and
the acquiring entity has obtained a majority of all voting power, all
remaining shareholders have dissenters' rights to receive the fair value
of their shares, which may not be less than the highest price paid per
share by the acquiring entity in the control share acquisition. 62 If the
shareholders vote not to grant voting rights to the control shares,
those shares are then subject to redemption for fair value by the
corporation.63

A.

MEETING CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

The Supreme Court upheld the Indiana Control Share Acquisition
Chapter against two arguments traditionally used to attack state
takeover laws: the preemption and commerce clause doctrines.
A state statute will violate the supremacy clause of the Federal
Constitution, and would be preempted, if compliance with the Williams Chapter and the state law is a physical impossibility, or if the
state law frustrates the purposes of the federal regulatory scheme.
The Court reasoned that, rather than interfering, the Indiana law
56. Id. at para. 1IA.09.
57. Id. at para. 11A.03.

58. Id. at para. I1A.05.
59. Id. at para. I1A.06.
60. Id. at para. l1A.07(b).

61. Id. at para. 11.07(c).
62. Id. at para. I1A.11.
63. Id. at para. I1A.10.
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actually furthered the basic purpose of the Williams Act, which is to
place investors on an equal footing with takeover bidders. 64 The
Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter protects the independent
shareholders against the contentions of management and the bidder
alike. Moreover, by allowing disinterested shareholders to vote as a
group, this type of statute mitigates the coercive effects of certain
tender offers on individual shareholders. The two-tiered front-end
loaded tender offer is one example of a transaction the Court found
65
sufficiently offensive to warrant such a protective state law .
The commerce clause was designed to prevent discrimination by
one state against residents of another state in the stream of interstate
commerce. The extra-territorial reach of the Indiana statute, its critics
argued, allowed Indiana to impair the interests of residents of other
states. The Court rejected this argument, primarily because the statute
had the same effects on tender offers regardless of the residence of
the offeror, and therefore did not favor local business over interstate
commerce.66
Additionally, the Court reasoned, an incorporating state creates
the target corporation and thus has an appropriate role in overseeing
its governance and in promoting stable relations among its stockholders. 67 The state's interest is enhanced given that, under both the
Indiana and proposed Illinois statutes, the corporation and its shareholders must bear a significant nexus to the state, in addition to being
a domestic corporation. Corporations, and hence their equity securities, are subject to a vast range of state regulations which inescapably
have an impact upon the market for their securities. Control share
acquisition statutes merely vest disinterested shareholders with the
decisionmaking power to consider the merits of a possible hostile
takeover or non-negotiated shift in control. Such a statute does not
unduly inhibit nonresident shareholders from effecting transactions in
the corporation's stock, but simply establishes procedures for methods
of operation in national securities markets.
VII.

CoNcLusIoN

The foregoing clearly demonstrates the need for state takeover
laws. The Williams Act, although thought adequate in 1968 when it
was adopted, no longer establishes a "level playing field". Arbitra64. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46.
65. Id. at 1646.
66. Id. at 1649.
67. Id. at 1650-51.
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geurs and raiders have learned their way around that Act and target
companies have found themselves vulnerable against the acts of hostile
raiders. State legislatures, in recent years, have adopted over 60
versions of first and second generation takeover laws. Potential targets
of takeovers have adopted numerous exotic defenses, including a
variety of poison pills. All of these activities have made it abundantly
clear that the Williams Act is simply not doing the job. Since the
federal government has not preempted the field with adequate legislation, the states have reacted by adopting a variety of state takeover
laws in order to bring some type of equilibrium to the situation. Since
employees and local communities are often adversely affected by these
hostile takeover activities, state takeover laws have, in fact, become
a necessity and they will continue to stay in place until such time as
the federal government preempts the area with a fair takeover law.

